Book Chapters

This book chapter analyzes the national success and subnational failure of Alvaro Uribe’s political party: Democratic Center (Centro Democrático). Shortly after its founding in 2014, the Democratic Center sprung into the political arena as one of Colombia’s strongest electoral forces. In four years, it won the presidency and became one of the strongest parties in Congress. Sub-nationally, however, the CD has not performed as well. Up until 2022, its vote share was less than half of the vote share it received in nationwide elections. We argue that this disparity is linked to two interrelated variables: the cleavage along which the CD developed its partisan identity, and its weak sub-national partisan structures. The security cleavage emphasized by the CD mobilized core supporters and was broad enough to gain the support of socially liberal conservatives in congressional and presidential elections. However, it was irrelevant sub-nationally, where politics revolved around different issues, and patronage was more important. Unlike other political parties, the CD cannot rely on local political networks to address these deficiencies. Its personalistic structure hindered the party’s ability to attract local politicians with well-developed clientele-based networks, who were unwilling to join a party that curtailed their ability to manage their sphere of influence however they saw fit.

The peace agreement with the guerrilla group FARC signed by Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) is arguably one of the most important achievements in Colombia's recent history. Yet, in 2016 citizens voted against it in a plebiscite. This outcome is particularly puzzling, specially if we take into account the more positive attitude displayed by Colombians towards Alvaro Uribe's (2002-2010) demobilization agreement with equally violent paramilitary groups in 2003-2006. What explains Colombians different attitudes towards these two peace processes? In this book chapter, we trace the narratives surrounding these two groups and how they shaped the way Colombians perceived the beneficiaries of these agreements. Unlike what happened with paramilitary groups, which were able to portray themselves as "self-defense armies" created to "step in" in areas where the state was missing, the FARC were stereotyped as an non-ideological group of "narcoterrorists'' whose combatants used violence to enrich themselves. When faced with the decision to support or not the peace agreement with the guerrilla (with all its complexities) citizens resorted to this stereotype in order to activate a deservigness heuristic and form an opinion about the peace process. Seen as "greedy," the ex-guerrilla members were thought of as undeserving of the concessions made in the agreement.

The importance of political parties has been at the heart of the debate about regime and regime change. Parties are essential actors for democratic politics. They can trigger transitions from and to democracy, polarize making democracies vulnerable to breakdown, or manage conflict to protect democratic institutions. However, not all parties or party systems are equal. The levels of fragmentation, polarization, and institutionalization in any given party and/or party system are key to understanding the rise, fall, and survival of democracy. In Latin America, the literature has focused, mostly, on party and party system institutionalization. In general, scholars agree that institutionalization fosters democracy. The organizational strength and embeddedness of political parties in society and the extent to which they interact regularly in stable ways, they argue, is key to the survival of democratic politics. There are instances, however, that suggest that this relationship is more problematic than the literature assumes. In contexts of crisis, highly institutionalized parties and party systems can be slow to adjust to new groups or demands and stiffen party leaders’ ability to respond to new issues. When facing a polarizing potential autocrat, for instance, high levels of party and party system institutionalization could hurt more than help democracy. They can reduce the ability of politicians to attract moderate voters from opposing parties, hinder their capacity to counteract antisystemic trends in order to lead opposition efforts, or limit the extent to which they can reach across the aisle to build ideologically diverse prodemocratic coalitions.

Unlike most of the other cases in which once institutionalized systems either collapsed or seriously frayed, Colombia did not experience traumatic bursts of hyperinflation or severe economic downturns. The decomposition of Colombia’s traditional party system occurred in relative economic tranquility compared to the massive upheaval so many other Latin American countries experienced. The economic distresses that were pivotal in undermining traditional parties in Argentina, Peru, and Venezuela are not central to the Colombian story of party system deinstitutionalization.

In the Colombian case, the mismanagement of the security situation by both traditional parties and a severe security threat in the early 2000s fostered deep change in the competition for the presidency and altered national party competition. In the midst of an increasing disconnect between regional and national party politics, these changes did not have the same effect sub-nationally. Local patronage and clientelistic structures allowed the two traditional parties, particularly the Liberal Party, to survive. Although some regional politicians switched to new parties, the pace of change in regional politics was slower. The Liberal and Conservative parties remained relevant actors in municipal and regional elections. Consequently, even though Colombia’s party landscape changed substantially after the early 1990s, the system did not collapse.

"El presente capítulo pretende compren-der de manera más profunda la configuración y comportamiento de la oposición en las pasadas elecciones y en el inicio del período legislati-vo. Siguiendo las principales teorías desarrolladas en este campo por la Ciencia Política, éste define la oposición política colombiana de acuerdo a dos parámetros: coherencia y responsabilidad. En él se sostiene que la oposición al gobierno de Santos es bimodal —con un “nodo” a la izquierda y otro a la derecha— y combina elementos responsables e irresponsables. Dicha composición, se sostiene aquí, es el resultado tanto de clivajes sociales —específicamente el conflicto armado— como de reglas institucionales que condicionan el comportamiento de los partidos y facciones políticas en elecciones y Congreso."